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Diverging trends in 2004 accession states show how fragile




It is now over a decade since the 2004 enlargement which brought eight states in Central and Eastern
Europe into the EU, alongside Cyprus and Malta. Craig Willy writes that while most of these states
greeted EU accession enthusiastically, political trends have been diverse in the decade since. While
some countries, such as Poland, have embraced a largely ‘Western’ political model, other states
such as Hungary have started to move in the opposite direction. He argues that these
developments illustrate how fragile the attachment to the EU and Western institutions really is in
Central-Eastern European states.
The nations of Central-Eastern Europe provide an interesting case study of the resilience of
Europeanist and liberal-democratic institutions and values in the face of economic crisis. Inevitably it is difficult to
generalise about such a diverse group of nations – whether it be the Baltic states, the Visegrád countries or the
Balkan countries. Overall trends are, however, somewhat negative.
As the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index
(BTI) 2014 states, in East-Central and Southeast
Europe “political and economic transformation have
been rolled back somewhat, with the quality of
governance diminishing further in many countries. This
state of affairs is closely linked to the crisis within the
EU that followed on from the global financial crisis.”
For example, since 2006 most countries in the region
declined in the BTI Management Index which captures
the quality of political leadership in areas such as
consensus-building and international cooperation.
There have also been declines in many countries’
Status Index scores reflecting the falling quality of their
democracy and/or market economy. There are,
however, significant divergences between countries, the
most striking perhaps being that between Poland under
the self-consciously liberal-Europeanist Donald Tusk,
and Hungary under the conservative-nationalist Viktor
Orbán.
Poland is a rare European country that has not suffered a recession during the financial and Eurozone crises. The
ruling Civic Platform (PO) was able to win re-election in 2011, a first in Polish politics since 1989, in the face of a
Law & Justice party (PiS) whose conservatism and nationalism in some ways are similar to that of Hungary’s ruling
party, Fidesz.
The latest edition of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI) concludes that “Poland
plays a trendsetting role among the East and Central European countries”. On democratic quality the study ranks
Poland at eighth place out of 41 countries in the OECD and European Union. This is particularly due to
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advancements in the areas of media freedom, legal certainty, judicial oversight and electoral processes. Poland also
boasts a very high level of reform capacity, reflecting significant progress in planning and implementing strategic
reforms – a feature which naturally helps overcoming times of economic and political crisis.
Hungary in contrast occupies the second to last place in SGI’s democracy ranking. Moreover, the economic crisis
led to the Hungarian economy shrinking 6.8 per cent in 2009 and many citizens saw their wealth wiped out: the cost
of mortgages (often held in foreign currency whose value rose relative to the Hungarian forint) skyrocketed, the
number of people enjoying middle class incomes shrank by about a third, and the unemployment rate exploded
from 7 to 12 per cent.
The risk of excessive boom and bust cycles
The causes of economic success and failure are always complicated, but the Hungarian example shows again the
risk of excessive boom and bust cycles. When standards of living are unsustainably high – based on malinvestment
or visible/invisible debt – the fall invariably fuels anger and resentment. Indeed, several Communist regimes fell in
part because their consumption levels were based on Western debt. The fall of economic well-being typically
accentuates ethnocentrism and ethnic conflicts, each community looking for its own members to get as big a part of
a shrinking pie, a pattern seen in Central-Eastern Europe as recently as the collapse of Yugoslavia and as far back
as the Middle Ages.
Fidesz has used its power to pass a new Constitution, to appoint their people to formally independent institutions,
and to try to “lock in” conservative-nationalist policies by requiring a two-thirds majority for all changes. While this
has attracted condemnation from many international observers and particularly from the European Union – which
has specifically criticised the Hungarian government’s action on retiring judges, the independence of the central
bank and on budget deficits – nationalist parties remain extremely popular there: Fidesz attracted 44.5 per cent of
the vote in parliamentary elections last April, while the even more nationalist Jobbik won 20.5 per cent. Outsiders
seeking to help liberal allies face a difficult dilemma: In trying to help local liberals, they risk accusations of “foreign
meddling” and of stoking “rally-around-the-flag” nationalism.
Europeanism as not an end in itself
For many citizens, Europeanism is more a means to an end – access to Western-style standards of living and
quality of government – than an end in itself. And when these hopes do not materialise, corruption in particular
remains a severe problem in many countries almost 25 years after the fall of Communism, disappointed citizens
may turn to other political options, both ideologically (nationalism) and geopolitically (many nationalists have grown
increasingly attracted to Russia as an alternative to the EU). The often exceedingly low turnout for European
parliamentary elections across Central-Eastern Europe – Slovakia set a new record at 13 per cent this year –
suggests that the attachment to EU politics is weak indeed.
Perhaps the lesson is for politicians and citizens to have realistic ambitions and not make promises which may not
be met. It is critical that citizens do not become accustomed to unsustainably high consumption based on financial
speculation or public and private debt, for the “correction” will inevitably entail a backlash. These countries must also
not assume that membership in Western European institutions will automatically lead to Western European
outcomes: most Central-Eastern European nations have little indigenous history of civil society and liberal
democracy (interwar Czechoslovakia was a notable exception) and participatory national development has often
been warped if not outright ruined by decades or centuries of imperial and Communist rule. The exceptional
outcomes in terms of good government and transparency of, say, Sweden or Germany, may well stay exceptional
for a long time.
In other ways, however, Central-Eastern European countries are growing more similar to Western ones. In
particular, active adherence to mainstream parties is often very low and shrinking. In most countries, a passive
majority is implicitly Europeanist and anti-nationalist, but with little passion or desire to defend the establishment. In
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contrast, protest parties, particularly nationalist ones, often have a strong minority of motivated supporters who are
positively convinced of their political vision. In light of populists’ progress in the recent EU elections, Europeanists will
have to, more than ever, move towards a new consensus offering a positive political vision which can show that the
EU and the West can still deliver on peace, democracy and prosperity.
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